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Because the effluent was not fungible with the river water, the
court reversed the district court's conclusion, holding that the effluent
became state water once discharged into the San Marcos River. Unless
the owner of the effluent can identify the effluent in the watercourse
and divert it before it commingles with the state water, the water is
presumed to become the watercourse. Therefore the court found if
the City wishes to reuse water, it must do so within the framework of
Senate Bill 1.
Aimee Wagstaff

Watts v. State, No. 14-99-00811-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex.
App. July 24, 2003) (holding trial court's improper instruction and
taking ofjudicial notice as to whether waters in drainage ditch were
waters of the State constituted harmless error where jury could not
reasonably reach a different conclusion than the instruction).
The State of Texas charged John Watts with water pollution, a
misdemeanor. A jury sitting for the Fifteenth County Criminal Court
in Harris County found Watts guilty. The Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals affirmed Watt's conviction. However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction based on a jury instruction
given by the trialjudge. The appellate court then remanded the case
to the intermediate court of appeals to apply the harmless error rule to
the trial judge's instruction. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District then found the Judge's instruction harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State prosecuted Watts for discharging sewage within 150 feet
of a drainage ditch. The Texas criminal water pollution statute
provided that knowing discharges into or adjacent to "waters in the
state" constituted a misdemeanor offense. Therefore, the critical issue
regarding Watts' guilt was whether water in the drainage ditch
constituted "waters in the state." The trial court took judicial notice of
American PlantFood, a past Texas Court of Appeals case, and instructed
the jury that water in a drainage ditch was "waters in the state." On
appeal, Watts argued this instruction deprived him of his right to ajury
trial regarding an essential question of fact.
The court reviewed the instruction and held beyond a reasonable
doubt that the instruction did not contribute to the conviction. The
court reasoned that the instruction was harmless error because no
juror could have reasonably interpreted the water pollution statute so
that the broad and inclusive term, "waters in the state," would not
include water in a drainage ditch located in the state. The court also
rejected Watts' argument that the trial judge's instruction that the
drainage ditch was a type of surface water the legislature meant to
protect under the statute prejudiced Watts because the instruction
should have regarded water in the drainage ditch and not the drainage
ditch itself. The court reasoned that water must be in the ditch by
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implication because a dry ditch could not reasonably be encompassed
within the term "waters of the state." Therefore, the court held the
improper instruction constituted harmless error and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Holly Shook

VIRGINIA
Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 581 S.E.2d 510 (Va. 2003) (holding
failure of pleadings to put ownership of pond's waters in issue
precluded circuit court from considering the issue as within general
prayer for relief).
This case involved a dispute regarding ownership of Gaskins Pond,
including the bed and water within the pond. Bay House Associates
("Bay House") owned the pond bed in fee simple. Formerly, a small
strip of land separated the pond from Chesapeake Bay. In recent
years, a small opening within the pond bottom created an outlet
allowing the waters to flow freely between Gaskin Pond and
Chesapeake Bay. As the opening of the pond grew bigger, many of the
neighboring landowners constructed piers grounded in, and
extending into, the once isolated pond.
Claiming these piers
trespassed onto its land, Bay House sent letters to its neighbors
requesting immediate removal of the piers. The neighbors did not
comply; thus, Bay House sued seeking injunctive relief in the Circuit
Court of Northumberland County.
Although Bay House only sought injunctive relief to force removal
of the base of the piers from the pond bed, the circuit court granted
unrequested relief by finding Bay House to own in fee simple the pond
bed and the waters of the pond. The issue on appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court was whether the circuit court had authority to grant
unrequested relief. The court held a litigant's pleadings are essential
as his or her proof, and a court may not award particular relief unless
it is substantially in accord with the case asserted in the pleadings.
Furthermore, every litigant is entitled to be told by her adversary in
plain and explicit language the grounds of complaint or defense,
especially when the respondent has the burden of proof involved in an
affirmative defense, such as the case here. Here, the court noted that
Bay House requested both specific and general prayers for relief, and
further asserted that enjoining the neighbors from using the water of
Gaskins Pond was not inconsistent with the specific prayer request
regarding land ownership; therefore, the injunction should be upheld.
However, a general prayer will support relief only for those matters
placed in controversy by the pleadings and, thus, any relief granted
must be supported by allegations of material facts in the pleadings that
will sustain such relief. Therefore, because Bay House's request for

